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ABSTRACT
Deep learning relies on a very specific kind of neural net-
works: those superposing several neural layers. In the last
few years, deep learning achieved major breakthroughs in
many tasks such as image analysis, speech recognition, nat-
ural language processing, and so on. Yet, there is no theoret-
ical explanation of this success. In particular, it is not clear
why the deeper the network, the better it actually performs.
We argue that the explanation is intimately connected
to a key feature of the data collected from our surround-
ing universe to feed the machine learning algorithms: large
non-parallelizable logical depth. Roughly speaking, we con-
jecture that the shortest computational descriptions of the
universe are algorithms with inherently large computation
times, even when a large number of computers are available
for parallelization. Interestingly, this conjecture, combined
with the folklore conjecture in theoretical computer science
that P 6= NC, explains the success of deep learning.
Turing Test and Learning Machines
In 1950, Alan Turing [22] boldly conjectured that passing the
now-called Turing test would require machine learning. His
amazing insight was essentially the following. The human
brain has around 1015 synapses and 109 of these synapses
are likely critical to the kind of natural language processing
needed to pass the Turing test. Turing went on regarding
this quantity as the minimal amount of bits needed for any
algorithm to pass the test. In modern terms, we would say
that the Kolmogorov complexity [10] of the Turing test is
likely to be of the order of 109 bits. This corresponds to
saying that no shorter algorithm can solve this problem.
Unfortunately, writing quality source codes that are 109
bits long is extremely challenging, tedious, time-consuming
and prone to errors, even for large teams of top software
developers. Recall that there are around 210
9
such source
codes, which is much larger than the number of particles
in the universe. Back in 1950, Turing foresaw that, around
2000, computer science would undergo a revolution, as it
would rely more and more on machine-written rather than
hand-written algorithms. Machine learning (or learning ma-
chines, as Turing called it) would thus correspond to the
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superhuman ability of computers to explore the space of
algorithms whose Kolmogorov complexity exceeds the giga-
byte. Of course, the key to this new capability of computers
is their superhuman computational power, as well as the
availability of huge amounts of data to guide them in their
exploration of 109-bit-long source codes.
Now, Turing did not himself specify what machine learn-
ing algorithm to use. Few years later, Solomonoff [17, 18]
proposed applying Bayes’ rule to all terminating Turing ma-
chines. Denoting T the set of such machines and D the ob-
served data, Solomonoff’s machine learning algorithm, called
Solomonoff’s induction, consists of computing the posterior
credence P[T |D] of a terminating Turing machine T given
data D by
P[T |D] = P[D|T ]P[T ]∑
S∈T P[D|S]P[S]
,
where P[D|T ] is the probability that the Turing machine T
assigns to data D and P[T ] is the prior probability of the
Turing machine T which, for the sum of priors to equal 1,
will typically have to be exponentially small in the size of
the description of T . Interestingly, Solomonoff proved two
things:
1. Solomonoff proved that his very general approach to
machine learning was complete, in the sense that it
provably determined the best-possible predictive the-
ory from an amount of data whose size is (roughly) the
Kolmogorov complexity of the data itself.
2. Solomonoff also proved however that his induction was
incomputable. In short, this is because the space of
all terminating Turing machines that Solomonoff pro-
posed to explore is ill-behaved. Indeed, as Turing [21]
showed in 1936 through the infamous halting problem,
this space is not a recursively enumerable set. (Be-
sides, Solomonoff’s use of Bayes’ rule is way too com-
putationally costly to be applied in practice.)
This naturally led to rather focus on restricted better-
behaved computational models, e.g. linear classifiers, whose
exploration is facilitated by some easy-to-compute learning
rule, such as (stochastic) gradient descent. This allows to au-
tomate the data-driven exploration of a restricted subspace
of large-Kolmogorov-complexity algorithms, in a way that
humans cannot match. This is arguably why machine learn-
ing works in theory. What is less clear is why deep learning
is particularly effective. Before discussing this, let us first
recall what deep actually means which, in turn, requires to
recall some basic elements of neural networks.
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Figure 1: A neural network with 3 hidden layers.
Neural Networks: the Deeper the Better
Neural networks are often regarded as the most promising
restricted computational model for machine learning. Neu-
rons in such a network can be thought of as elementary pro-
cessing units, while the directed edges of the network can be
thought of as communication channels between processing
units. A crucial feature of neurons, which we shall get back
to below, is that they perform fast nonlinear operations.
Neurons typically compute a linear combination of incom-
ing signals, and then apply a sigmoid function or a piecewise
linear transformation to the linear combination.1 But neu-
rons may as well compute other fast nonlinear operations,
e.g. softmax, max-pooling or energy-based sampling.
One popular neural network architecture is the feed-forward
one [16]. In this particular network, neurons are organized
in layers. The outer layer is fed with raw data. Neurons
of this outer layer then communicate their data to some (or
sometimes all) of the neurons of the first hidden layer. These
neurons perform their nonlinear transformation of their in-
puts, then communicate their results to neurons of the sec-
ond layer, and so on. In this architecture, the number of neu-
rons per layer is commonly known as the width of the neural
network, while the number of layers is called its depth. Deep
learning roughly boils down to favoring depth over width.2
This is in contrast with what is sometimes called shallow
learning.
An essential feature of neural networks is the ease with
which they can be adjusted to data, usually through the
(stochastic) gradient descent of a data-driven loss function
combined with a back-propagation algorithm [16]. Such a
learning scheme typically corresponds to adapting the im-
portance each neuron gives to its different input signals in
order to better fit the data, or even the effect of an input on
the output.
Over the last few years, deep learning has allowed monu-
mental breakthroughs in a huge number of areas, including
image analysis, speech recognition, natural language pro-
cessing, car driving, winning the game of Go, music compo-
sition, painting drawing, doodling and so on. We refer to
[12] for a more thorough list of deep learning success stories.
1Note that the coefficients of the linear combination are usu-
ally associated to the communication channels, also known
as synapses or edges. These two ways of defining neural
networks are however equivalent. Yet, here, we shall clearly
distinguish communication steps from computation steps.
2It is not clear though how to relevantly define depth for
recurrent neural network.
Figure 2: Space of algorithms and problems.
The repeated and surprising successes of deep learning have
convinced most practitioners of the fact that deep learning
works in practice. 3
However, and as we pointed out earlier, while Turing an-
ticipated the success of machine learning long ago, the suc-
cess of deep learning, as opposed to other machine learning
schemes, remains a mystery. Many researchers often assert
that no one quite really understands why deep learning per-
forms so well. Yann LeCun, one of the main pioneers of deep
learning, talks about the ”unreasonable effectiveness of deep
learning”[11].
Conjectures
We present below three conjectures. The first can be viewed
as a rephrasing of Turing’s argument in modern terminol-
ogy. As Turing would likely argue, it explains why machine
learning often works better than human-written codes.
Conjecture 1. Most of the data from the current state
of our universe and most of the problems we aim to solve
with these data, as well as any good approximations of these
data and problems, have a Kolmogorov complexity larger
than 109 bits.
Our second and main conjecture essentially says that the
structures we observe in our daily lives have an inherent ap-
parent complexity, or interestingness. Apparent complexity
can be precisely captured by the notion of logical depth, in-
troduced by Bennett [3]. More specifically, the logical depth
of a datum, e.g. a video or a data set of images, is the com-
putation time of the shortest algorithm that outputs this
datum.4 We argue that data from our daily lives typically
feature large logical depth. In other words, our data can
3Given sometimes huge computation power: deep learning
for image recognition for instance typically requires billions
of images, whose mere processing was beyond the reach of
the fastest computers a few decades ago. In fact, deep learn-
ing now typically requires GPU hardware.
4To avoid degeneracy, this definition is sometimes replaced
by the smallest computation time of algorithms whose length
is at most the Kolmogorov complexity plus a small fixed
constant.
usually be remarkably well compressed, and the decompres-
sion of the optimal data compression often requires large
computational power.
Conjecture 2. Most of the data from the current state
of our universe and most of the problems we aim to solve
with these data, as well as any good approximations of these
data and problems, have a large non-parallelizable logical
depth.
We will discuss below the importance of non-parallelizability
and give several examples arguing for logical depth. Before
doing so however, let us first better explain what the conjec-
tures actually imply. Essentially, the two conjectures above
say that the full description of our universe requires both
large Kolmogorov complexity and large non-parallelizable
logical depth. In fact, it seems that many classical problems
can be located somewhere in a diagram of two axes that
correspond to these two distinct measures of computational
complexity. The same seems to hold for machine learning
algorithms as well. Figure 2 depicts the relative complexity
of different problems and algorithms.
Now, in order to understand the relation with deep learn-
ing, it is important to observe that, strictly speaking, a deep
neural network does not perform more computation steps
than a shallow one. Indeed, each neuron performs a compu-
tation step. In this sense, the number of computation steps
of a neural network corresponds to the number of neurons
it features. The relevant concept of depth of a problem, as
highlighed in our main conjecture, is precisely that of non-
parallelizable logical depth.
Non-parallelizable logical depth is intimately connected
to the fundamental open question in theoretical computer
science P versus NC. This question asks whether problems
that can be solved in polynomial time on a Turing machine
can be solved in polylogarithmic time on a polynomial-size
logic gate circuits. It is widely believed that this is not
the case: some polynomial-time problems are fundamen-
tally non-parallelizable. This intuition seems precisely to
be corroborated by the success of deep learning over shallow
learning, as deep learning seems able to compute functions
of large non-parallelizable logical depth that highly paral-
lelized shallow neural networks cannot. In fact, this is our
third conjecture.
Conjecture 3. At equivalent Kolmogorov complexity, deeper
neural networks compute functions with larger non-parallelizable
logical depth.
Note that the P 6= NC conjecture would only represent
an asymptotic version of what is needed for our third con-
jecture. Having said this, given that the size of each input of
neural networks is often less than a gigabit, a logarithmic-
time function of such inputs would typically terminate in at
most log2(10
9) ≈ 30 steps, which could be computed by a
neural network of depth 30. Thus, if P = NC, one would
expect that deep learning with a lot more than 30 layers
does not significantly outperform neural networks with 30
layers. However, current state-of-the-art deep learning algo-
rithms can have ”over 1200 layers and still yield meaningful
improvements” [8]. This seems like a strong evidence for
P 6= NC.
Let us recapitulate. On the one hand, hand-written codes
have successfully determined solutions to large logical depth
problems, like playing chess, but they are limited in their
Kolmogorov complexity. On the other hand, shallow ma-
chine learning allows a better exploration of a subspace of
large Kolmogorov complexity algorithms. However, shal-
low machine learning excludes all algorithms whose (paral-
lelized) computation times exceed a few (non-parallelized)
computation steps. Considering our three conjectures, both
of these approaches inevitably underperform, because our
current state of the universe and many classical problems
seem to precisely require algorithms of both (a) large Kol-
mogorov complexity as well as (b) large non-parallelizable
logical depth. Deep learning is the current state-of-the-art
approach to efficiently explore a space of algorithms with
both properties. We argue that this is why deep learning
works in theory.
Corroborating the Main Conjecture
To corroborate our main conjecture, saying that the data
used to feed our algorithms have an apparent complexity,
consider the following examples.
1. Think of the way we, as humans, would describe many
of the pictures of the web. Perhaps we would say that,
on some image, we see a cat sitting on a laptop key-
board, that the cat is beige and puffy and that it looks
sad. Somehow, however incomplete, this amazingly
short description of the image successfully describes
much of the information carried through the pixel lu-
minosities and colours of a potentially high-definition
image. Clearly, some thinking seems required to de-
compress and to visualize the scene with this infor-
mation. We invite the reader to do this effort, before
comparing what she imagined with Figure 4.
2. While sound could a priori be any kind of time series,
most of our music is actually highly codified. Music is
played by a small number of instruments with charac-
teristic timber. Instruments play a handful of possibles
pitches at a handful of possible rhythms, and even the
combination of pitches and rhythms is often restricted
by the choice of music genre. One can thus describe
music in a very efficient manner, typically by a ZIP
compression of music sheets. Yet, deriving the actual
music from its efficient description may require a lot
of computation.
3. Morphogenesis is a wonderfully sophisticated biolog-
ical computation that has captivated Turing [23]. It
is the ability of a single egg to morph into an actual
living organism. Organisms can thereby be regarded
as structures of large logical depth. Indeed, most of
the information about this structure can be found in
a DNA whose size is usually of a few (probably com-
pressable) megabits. This corresponds to a reason-
ably small Kolmogorov complexity. However, deriving
the future structure of the living organisms from its
genome is likely to necessarily require a huge amount
of computation steps. Indeed, gestation typically lasts
months.
4. Fractals are well-known for being computationally de-
manding. Indeed, fractals can often be obtained by a
very simple procedure being recursively repeated over
and over, as in the case of the Romanesco cabbage
Figure 3: Romanesco cabbage.
(see Figure 3). This typically corresponds to a low
Kolmogorov complexity, but a large non-parallelizable
computational depth. Intriguingly, simulations by [14]
show that random deep neural networks compute more
fractal-like structures than shallow ones do.
5. Non-parallelizable logical depth allows to better un-
derstand why many classical automata such as Wol-
fram’s rule 30, Langton’s ant or Conway’s game of life
are typically known to feature chaotic unpredictable
phenomena, to the point where their unpredictability
is sometimes used for pseudo-random number gener-
ation. This may seem somewhat contradictory with
the fact that these automata are in fact deterministic
and computable. However, we argue that what is actu-
ally meant is that such phenomena are unpredictable
by our brains (or our machine learning models), be-
cause the logical depth of the phenomena far exceeds
the depth of our brains (or even of our current deepest
artificial neural networks).
6. There is a remarkable parallel between the success of
deep learning and what Wigner [24] famously dubbed
”the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the
natural sciences”. A common denominator to both ap-
proaches to describing our world is the prevalence of
depth. Indeed, mathematics can be regarded as the
pinnacle of what humans have produced in terms of
logical depth. Even though mathematical textbooks
rarely exceed a thousand pages, their understanding
often require years of study and a huge amount of cog-
nitive efforts. We argue that the formidable logical
depth of mathematics has been the key to understand
physical phenomena of large logical depth (and small
Kolmogorov complexity), in a manner that our com-
paratively shallow human brains cannot match.
The very notion of apparent complexity has been previ-
ously studied in [1], and was argued to be a likely tran-
sitional phase in closed systems whose initial state was of
remarkably small entropy — which means that our argu-
ment for the effectiveness of deep learning may have roots
in the second law of thermodynamics. In particular, [1] pre-
sented four distinct measures of ”apparent complexity”, and
Figure 4: A beige, puffy and sad-looking cat sitting
on a laptop keyboard.
proved that they all are related. Logical depth was one of
these four measures. This give us good reasons to believe
that the current state of the universe has a remarkably large
logical depth.
The Main Conjecture in Perspective
Not surprisingly, several tentative explanations of the suc-
cess of deep learning were recently proposed. Many share
the same purpose, namely identifying a relevant space of
functions that require either depth or exponentially large
width [7, 4, 2]. To simplify the theoretical analysis, these
approaches usually rather focus on one particular kind of
neural networks, e.g. ReLU in [19, 20], ReLU, sigmoids and
threshold in [5] or logic gate circuits in [25]. Logic gate cir-
cuits can be regarded as specific kinds of neural networks
whose inter-neural communications are bits. For instance,
[6] proved the existence of functions whose computations
can be performed with a polynomial-size logic gate circuit
of depth k, but which require exponentially many logic gates
to be run on circuits of depth k − 1.
A somewhat different approach has been taken by re-
searchers from Google and Stanford [15, 14]. Instead of
searching for a specific space of functions that only deeper
neural networks can compute, they determined typical prop-
erties that functions computed through deep neural net-
works have. To do so, they considered a Gaussian probabil-
ity distributions over deep neural networks and showed that,
for certain such probability distributions, a certain measure
of the complexity of the functions computed by the ran-
dom deep neural networks was increasing at a rate of the
form widthΘ(depth) in expectation. In particular, the effect
of depth is exponential, while width only acts in a polyno-
mial way. The measures of the complexity of the functions
differ in the two papers [15, 14], as each adapts its definitions
to the neural networks under study. Yet both essentially boil
down to some measure of nonlinearity.
One may also wonder how the results by [15, 14] relate to
our analysis. It is worth pointing out that there is a sense
in which a large amount of nonlinearity is typical of large
logical depth. Indeed, by opposition, the composition of lin-
ear operations remains a linear operation. As a result, an
algorithm that combines a large number of linear operations
is actually equivalent to a shorter algorithm that only com-
putes their composition in a single operation. Therefore,
the composition of linear operations does not increase logi-
cal depth. It is only the composition of nonlinear operations
that may do so.
Now, it was already argued [13] that physical processes
are fundamentally sequential, and hence any algorithm that
attempts to understand physical data should be sequential
as well. Our conjecture however differs from this claim. In-
deed, we argue that data derived from sequential processes
are not necessarily of large logical depth. As an example,
[1] observe that the early universe and the far-end universe
have low apparent complexity, even though they are derived
from a large number of computational steps. In fact, [1]
even argue that the large apparent complexity of our cur-
rent universe is only a temporary phase which will vanish
as entropy continues to increase. In any case, it is this fun-
damental computational property of our current universe,
measured in terms of non-parallelizable logical depth, that
our main conjecture relies on.
Corollaries and Further Steps
An interesting corollary of our conjecture is that state-of-
the-art predictive models whose predictions rely on a huge
amount of unavoidable computation time (rather than on
a huge amount of data) are unlikely to be superseded by
current machine learning algorithms, as all current machine
learning algorithms can be regarded as fast algorithms. Even
the deepest neural networks currently being used hardly ex-
ceed a few hundred non-parallelized computation steps.
A major difficulty with training even deeper models would
be the exploration (or learning) phase. Indeed, currently, a
major bottleneck of machine learning is the huge computa-
tion power needed for learning (we, humans, have to spread
our learning over decades). Models that would require larger
computation time to make predictions would likely require
larger computation time for learning as well. A solution to
this may be to decompose the learning into different phases.
This is actually how people learn to play chess, or other deep
endeavors like mathematics or computer science. Instead of
learning to play entire chess games repeatedly, chess play-
ers focus on independent lower-logical-depth states of chess
games, e.g. end games.
An important further step could be to foresee the exact
need for deeper learning, depending on the task at hand.
This challenge appears for humans as well. Indeed, as argued
by psychologists [9], our brains seem to feature two thinking
modes. One is fast, reactive and only partially reliable. It
is a shallow learning part of our brains. The other is slow
and more reliable. It is a deeper learning part of our brains.
One important problem that our brains repeatedly need to
solve is whether the slower part of our brain is needed to
solve the task at hand. Such a problem will likely need to
be solved for artificial intelligence as well.
Conclusion
We proposed here a very first step towards understanding
the success of deep learning. Basically, we argued that fun-
damental concepts in theoretical computer science, namely
Kolmogorov complexity, logical depth and the P vs NC con-
jecture, could provide better insights into the nature of the
data exploited by machine learning algorithms, and better
foresee which machine learning algorithms are most likely
to succeed in this endeavor. In short, neural networks and
specifically deep learning seems preferable over other ap-
proaches, mostly because neural networks allow for a facili-
tated exploration of a subspace of large-Kolmogorov-complexity
algorithms, and deep learning better matches the large non-
parallelizable logical depth of the current state of our uni-
verse.
Formalizing our main conjecture goes through a rigorous,
natural and exploitable definition of non-parallelizable log-
ical depth, which is non-trival. It would then be interest-
ing to mathematically prove that no shallow neural network
can compute large non-parallelizable logical depth, but that
deeper neural networks can. Moreover, determining the non-
parallelizable logical depth of real data, as well as of specific
(approximate) functions related to this data, e.g. chess play-
ing or passing the Turing test, would be a major step towards
a theoretical understanding of deep learning.
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